Financial crises through history · causes, liability, rescues and winners
A comparative history of financial crises, causes, responsibility, liability, rescues, beneficiaries and lasting consequences. The survey covers 47 crisis groups: ancient credit distress, medieval merchant banking, sovereign defaults, bubbles, banking panics, currency crises and major institutional or fraud-related failures. These categories have different systemic scale; Madoff, Archegos and a speculative bulb market are not presented as equivalent to a global depression.
Follow the money and the mechanism
Each case begins with a dated shock or representative anchor and an analytical note on responsibility and distribution. Later moments identify interventions, restructuring, official reviews, legal outcomes and reforms where documented. The questions are concrete: what made the balance sheet vulnerable, what triggered withdrawal or loss, which claims were protected, who supplied the money, who absorbed the damage, and what changed afterward?
Named beneficiaries include Soros’s fund investors in the sterling episode; Paulson & Co.’s mortgage-credit position; AIG counterparties; acquiring banks including JPMorgan and UBS; and Tai Mo Shan’s documented discounted-token arrangement. A contractual receipt, avoided loss, potential acquisition upside and realized net profit are different benefits. Government recoveries are likewise assessed case by case: AIG’s reported aggregate outcome differs from the UK’s nominal loss on its NatWest investment.
Responsibility is recorded precisely
Economic contribution, poor management, an official inquiry finding, a regulatory settlement, a civil verdict and a criminal sentence are distinguished. Mozilo’s settlement, Tourre’s civil verdict and Serageldin’s criminal sentence are separate events, as are the Madoff, Hwang and Bankman-Fried criminal outcomes. A regulator’s announced penalty is not necessarily money already distributed to victims. A lack of a recorded conviction does not establish that the conduct was prudent or harmless.
For older episodes the surviving evidence may not support a reliable named list of profits or a modern legal allocation of blame. The notes say so rather than inventing a villain or bailout. The account of Florence challenges simplistic blame of Edward III; tulip mania’s national economic scale is qualified; the Bubble Act is dated before the main South Sea collapse. Credit Suisse’s AT1 loss allocation includes the later partial court decision and announced appeal, rather than being treated as legally uncontested.
Explore the comparisons
Use crisis, region, type, role and actor tags to separate cases or examine one institution across events. Concept guides explain liquidity versus solvency, leverage, currency mismatch, settlement risk, bail-in, public-cost accounting and social consequences. Arrow explanations distinguish transmission, response, investigation and comparison; an arc is not a claim that every connected event has been proven to be the sole cause of the other.
Evidence and dates
Sources emphasize statutes, court records, regulator orders, official inquiries, central-bank histories, IMF evaluations and archival evidence, with scholarly and reputable secondary reporting where useful. Institutional accounts are identified as such, including evaluation of their own earlier decisions. Figures retain their units, scope and status: commitments are not disbursements, nominal proceeds are not inflation-adjusted returns, and fictitious account profits are not recoverable principal.
The selection extends to a 2026 Lebanese governance diagnostic and dated later accountability events. It is a substantive survey, not every financial disturbance ever recorded or a complete live docket of every appeal. Exact days, months, representative years and approximate medieval anchors are distinguished. All entries use Gregorian display; no continuing crisis or institutional legacy is assigned an artificial duration ending today.
The cover shows depositors in Michigan in February 1933, not a 1929 stock-exchange crowd. Other illustrations distinguish contemporary photographs, earlier portraits, later building views and satire. Individual entries provide their own context, attribution and public-domain or Creative Commons license.
Photographer not credited. · Bank Run in Michigan, USA, February 1933.jpg · Public domain. File and attribution No changes beyond thumbnail rendering/scaling.
119 moments · 0033-01-01T00:00:00Z CE – 2026-04-01T00:00:00Z CE · by @athan · @athan
SVB fails after losses, concentrated uninsured deposits and a rapid run
crisis: banks2023
region: united states
type: banking and interest-rate-risk crisis
role: crisis / trigger
actor: silicon valley bank
actor: greg becker
actor: signature bank
actor: first republic
actor: jpmorgan chase
actor: fdic
Silicon Valley Bank’s asset and funding structure becomes vulnerable as interest rates rise and depositors seek liquidity. Management does not adequately address interest-rate and liquidity risks, and concentrated uninsured customers can withdraw quickly. The Federal Reserve’s review also identifies supervisory weaknesses. Signature and First Republic then require separate interventions, while the crisis spreads confidence pressure beyond institutions with identical business models. **Crisis / comparison:** SVB fails after losses, concentrated uninsured deposits and a rapid run. **Role in the record:** crisis / trigger. **Date:** 2023-03-10 CE; day. Gregorian CE display, UTC. A year-only or month-only coordinate uses the first day only for positioning and does not assert that the event occurred on that day. Ancient dates are proleptic Gregorian year anchors. Pre-Gregorian and pre-reform events generally retain coarse historical precision rather than silently assigning an unconverted exact calendar day. **Sources:** - [Federal Reserve, Review of Supervision and Regulation of Silicon Valley Bank (2023)](https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/review-of-the-federal-reserves-supervision-and-regulation-of-silicon-valley-bank.htm) - [US Treasury, Federal Reserve and FDIC Joint Statement, 12 March 2023](https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20230312b.htm) - [FDIC, JPMorgan Assumes First Republic Deposits, 1 May 2023](https://www.fdic.gov/news/press-releases/2023/pr23034.html) **Image context:** Silicon Valley Bank offices in Tempe, Arizona; not a claim that this is the bank’s California headquarters or a photograph of a specific withdrawal. **Credit:** Tony Webster · Silicon Valley Bank, Temple, Arizona.jpg · CC BY 2.0. [File and attribution](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Silicon_Valley_Bank,_Temple,_Arizona.jpg); [license](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0). No changes beyond thumbnail rendering/scaling. **Related event — US authorities protect deposits and create a collateralized bank funding facility:** Same crisis record: deposit protection / liquidity. This connection identifies a response, consequence or later finding; it does not treat chronological succession alone as proof of causation. **Related event — JPMorgan acquires First Republic through FDIC resolution:** Same crisis record: assisted acquisition / beneficiary. This connection identifies a response, consequence or later finding; it does not treat chronological succession alone as proof of causation. **Related event — The Federal Reserve’s SVB review identifies management and supervisory failures:** Same crisis record: official accountability review. This connection identifies a response, consequence or later finding; it does not treat chronological succession alone as proof of causation. **Related event — UBS takes over Credit Suisse under emergency Swiss measures:** US bank failures form part of the market backdrop, while Credit Suisse has distinct longstanding weaknesses.
Date precision
day
Coordinate convention
Gregorian CE display, UTC. A year-only or month-only coordinate uses the first day only for positioning and does not assert that the event occurred on that day. Ancient dates are proleptic Gregorian year anchors. Pre-Gregorian and pre-reform events generally retain coarse historical precision rather than silently assigning an unconverted exact calendar day.
Crisis case
SVB fails after losses, concentrated uninsured deposits and a rapid run
Jurisdiction / region
United States
Causal or response role
crisis / trigger
Legal status of this record
Economic or institutional event; responsibility and case-specific legal outcomes are distinguished in the notes.
Named actors in the case
Silicon Valley Bank; Greg Becker; Signature Bank; First Republic; JPMorgan Chase; FDIC